 |
|
Shlomo Ben-Ami |
End of
a journey
How did
a peace process that started with such high hopes end with an intifada?
What really happened at Camp David? Former foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami
kept a diary there; in a conversation with Ari Shavit, he reveals, for
the first time, why the stormy negotiations ended in failure
By Ari Shavit
Ha'retz Tuesday, September
25, 2001 Tishrei 8, 5762
He says he's not sad,
only very concerned. Concerned in the deep sense of the word. Within four
or five years, the Middle East will be nuclearized, and it turns out that
the peace process is not what we thought it was. It turns out that the
Palestinian partner is not what we thought he was. And the national unity
government is paralyzed, doing nothing and capable of doing nothing. The
left refuses to engage in any intellectual stocktaking; the right refuses
to move toward any sort of solution. In the meantime, within this vacuum,
Yasser Arafat is hurtling us back into the 1970s, and Ariel Sharon into
the 1950s. Even here, in Kfar Sava, you can hear shooting at night. Every
night, for nearly the whole night, you can hear shooting from the yard
.
Shlomo Ben-Ami is also not particularly happy. In Jerusalem, Alik Ron,
the former Northern District police chief, has just completed his testimony
to the commission of inquiry investigating the police reaction to last
October's riots in Arab villages, when 13 of the demonstrators were shot
dead. Then the television news shows footage of the Labor Party primaries,
in which Ben-Ami himself did not participate. Even when the telephone
rings, and the European Union's Javier Solana is on the line - he gets
advice in fluent Spanish about some sort of idea that may perhaps advance
some sort of understanding - you can't get over the feeling that Shlomo
Ben-Ami is very much immersed in his own thoughts and reflections. And
with his stocktaking.
With the help of a
hefty pile of documents that he brings in from the next room, he tries
to explain what actually happened here. What went wrong. The summer shirt
he's wearing is from Camp David, a kind of American summer-camp shirt
from a summer camp that wasn't much of a success.
But Ben-Ami, who was
Ehud Barak's representative to the peace talks, claims again and again
that Camp David is not the crucial thing; that anyone who chooses to focus
on Camp David hasn't got a clue. Those two weeks in Maryland, which riveted
the world's attention, are only one piece of the puzzle.
Ben-Ami's charm hasn't
faded. At some remove from the high tension of power, he is relaxed and
smiling, with a captivating sense of humor. His analyses are deep and
complex. His contexts are multilingual and multicultural. When he places
his reading glasses on the tip of his nose and starts to read from the
diary he kept in those fateful days, he seems to be trying to understand.
Shlomo Ben-Ami,
what were the assumptions that guided you and the prime minister, Ehud
Barak, when you set out, in the spring of 2000, to terminate the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict?
"We had a number
of working assumptions, but I think the most important of them was the
basic assumption that has been shared by the Americans, the Europeans
and the Israeli center-left for years: that Oslo created a rational
order in the Middle East based on give-and-take, which in the future
would lead to an acceptable compromise; that in 1993 a quasi-state of
the Palestinians was established, in terms of orderly international
relations. In retrospect, this turned out to be a mistaken assumption,
It turned out that for [Palestinian leader Yasser] Arafat it was a huge
camouflage net behind which he fomented, and continues to foment, political
pressure and terrorism in different dosages in order to undermine the
very idea of two states for two nations."
TOP
Let's go back to
the beginning - to your first talks with Barak when he placed you in charge
of the negotiations. What kind of territorial compromise did you have
in mind then?
"In one of
our first meetings, Barak showed me a map that included the Jordan Rift
Valley and was a kind of very beefed-up Allon Plan [formulated by Yigal
Allon in the 1970s and based on a territorial compromise]. He was proud
of the fact that his map would leave Israel with about a third of the
territory. If I remember right, he gave the Palestinians only 66 percent
of the land. Ehud was convinced that the map was extremely logical.
He had a kind of patronizing, wishful-thinking, naive approach, telling
me enthusiastically, `Look, this is a state; to all intents and purposes
it looks like a state.'
"At that point,
I didn't argue with him. I didn't tell him to throw the map into the
garbage or to turn it into a kite. But later, in the wake of advance
talks with the Palestinians and internal clarifications, he understood
that it was impossible to present a map like that publicly."
TOP
What did you go
into the negotiations with, then? What was the official Israeli position
that you and Gilad Sher presented to the Palestinians in Stockholm in
May 2000?
"At Stockholm
we placed a map [with a ratio] of 12-88 on the table. We demanded three
settlement blocs [Etzion, Ariel, the Jerusalem area] and a security
hold in the Jordan Rift Valley for about 20 years. According to the
map we presented, the Jordan River line itself would remain under Israeli
sovereignty in order to prevent the entry of weapons and to forestall
any violation of the demilitarization arrangements. At Stockholm we
also objected to the idea of an exchange of territory. Our concept was
that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were the sand table within which
all the problems had to be resolved."
TOP
How did the Palestinians
react to this?
"They didn't
like looking at our maps. Abu Ala would tell me, `Shlomo, take the map
away.' In [private] talks, he would press me: What percentage do you
really mean? But in the guest house of the prime minister of Sweden,
with that marvelous view, and on the edge of a lake too beautiful to
describe, we had the best talks we ever had. The surroundings were tranquil,
the atmosphere was right, the approach was pragmatic. So much so that
we constructed a written framework for an agreement, and we even entered
into consultations with experts in international law on the correct
legal construction of the agreement. Our assessment was that we were
truly on the way to an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement."
TOP
What agreements
did you reach there?
"The term agreements
is too binding. Nothing was concluded. But there was understanding about
the need for settlement blocs and there was understanding that in connection
with security, the Palestinians would be flexible. On the subject of
the refugees we constructed an entire concept that was based on a solution
in Arab host-states, in the Palestinian state, in countries like Canada
and Australia, and on family reunification in Israel. In Stockholm we
talked about 10 or 15 thousand refugees who would be absorbed in Israel
over a period of years.
"Abu Ala and
Hasan Asfour didn't accept those figures, but they showed readiness
to enter into substantive talks and to discuss numbers. On the territorial
issue, too, the feeling was that they would meet us halfway. In a conversation
we had after Stockholm, at the Holiday Inn in Jerusalem, Abu Ala agreed
explicitly to 4 percent [remaining in Israel's hands]. So the feeling
was that [an agreement] was really within reach."
TOP
And Jerusalem?
"Jerusalem
was not discussed at all. Barak wasn't willing. I think that was a mistake.
If we had discussed Jerusalem, we would have come to Camp David better
prepared. But he was afraid of leaks and also that the very discussion
of Jerusalem would destabilize the government and put the coalition
at risk. So in the drafts we prepared, the Jerusalem clause remained
a blank page. Even that upset him. You can see a comment in his handwriting
on the documents we drew up in May: Barak preferred that even the heading
of the Jerusalem clause not appear in print."
TOP
What direction
did the process take in the wake of the Stockholm talks and ahead of Camp
David? If I had asked you in June or July 2000 what might be agreed upon,
what would you have said?
"Officially,
we didn't budge at that stage from the 12-88 map of Stockholm and from
the principle that there would be no exchange of territories. But in
one-on-one conversations, I talked about 8 to 10 percent [remaining
under Israeli control]. As I told you, Abu Ala mentioned 4 percent to
me. To the best of my knowledge, ahead of Camp David [U.S. president
Bill] Clinton received from the Palestinians a pledge of 2 percent.
So it could be assumed that we would go beyond 90 percent and the Palestinians
would go beyond 4 percent and we would meet at some point in the middle.
On the territorial issue, Clinton could have said that the sides were
not agreed on quantity, but agreed on the principle.
"What became
clear during the talks immediately after Stockholm was that the Palestinians
would show a certain flexibility concerning the settlement blocs, but
they were adamant on the eastern border and the Jordan Rift Valley.
They demanded a solution for the Jordan River border, and at that stage
we weren't willing to give them a guarantee of that."
TOP
And what about
Jerusalem and the refugees?
"There were
no detailed talks at all about Jerusalem. The only thing was a promise
that Arafat gave us, in a talk in Nablus, that the Western Wall and
the Jewish Quarter were ours. He talked at length about how he remembered
himself playing with Jewish children by the Western Wall in the 1930s,
so he knows that the Wall is ours. Some of the other Palestinians mentioned
Gilo several times, in a way that implied that they accepted the Jewish
neighborhoods in the eastern part of the city.
"But on the
question of the refugees, there was something of a regression in the
period between Stockholm and Camp David. Abu Mazen persuaded Abu Ala
not to get into any discussion of numbers, but to stick with the principle
of the right of return. After our meetings, Abu Ala brought the joint
document of Abu Ala and Yossi Beilin and showed me how many reservations
Abu Mazen himself had about that document, especially in regard to the
refugees.
"By the way,
not only Abu Mazen but Arafat too had reservations about the document.
When I asked Arafat about it in a talk we held in Gaza a few months
later, he replied contemptuously: `Words, words.'"
TOP
What were Israel's
opening positions at the Camp David meeting in mid-July? What was the
official Israeli position at the peace summit?
"The map I
placed on the table at Camp David for the Palestinian team to peruse,
in the presence of President Clinton, was the 12-88 map. Between Stockholm
[May 2000] and Taba [January 2001] we did not officially present any
other map to the Palestinians. We didn't agree to pare down our official
stand unless there was movement on their part, and because there was
no movement on their part, we didn't present new maps.
"But unofficially,
it was clear that we were ready for 8 to 10 percent. We still objected
to a territorial exchange. We still demanded that Jerusalem remain united
under our sovereignty.
"The Palestinians,
in contrast, insisted that the discussion open with a recognition by
Israel of the 1967 lines. They were very rigid on that point. I will
never forget a discussion in the presence of President Clinton and [secretary
of state] Madeleine Albright and [national security adviser] Sandy Berger
in which I suggested that we enter into a discussion on the basis of
the hypothesis of the 1967 borders, but without committing ourselves
to them. Abu Ala vehemently refused to enter into that dynamic. He insisted
that we first of all recognize the borders of June 4, 1967.
"After a time,
Clinton became boiling mad and started shouting terribly. He told Abu
Ala that this wasn't a speech at the United Nations, and that the Palestinians
had to come up with positive proposals of their own. Clinton shouted
that no one would be able to get everything he wanted and that he too
would like to serve a third term as president, but he knew that was
impossible. He turned completely red and finally got up and stalked
out. Abu Ala was deeply offended. From that moment, almost the only
thing he did at Camp David was drive around the lawns in a golf cart."
TOP
Didn't the Palestinians
make a counterproposal?
"No. And that
is the heart of the matter. Never, in the negotiations between us and
the Palestinians, was there a Palestinian counterproposal. There never
was and there never will be. So the Israeli negotiator always finds
himself in a dilemma: Either I get up and walk out because these guys
aren't ready to put forward proposals of their own, or I make another
concession. In the end, even the most moderate negotiator reaches a
point where he understands that there is no end to it."
TOP
Was there ever
a moment when things seemed to be otherwise? When it seemed that some
sort of breakthrough might be achieved at Camp David?
"When the feeling
was that we were treading water, the president organized a simulation
game that went on for a whole night, until noon the next day. The key
to the game was that it did not obligate the leaders. The participants
were Gilad Sher, Yisrael Hasson and myself, against Saeb Erekat, Mohammed
Dahlan and a Palestinian lawyer from Oxford.
"In this game,
for the first time, we put forward a proposal about Jerusalem. The proposal
was that the outer envelope of Arab neighborhoods in the city would
be under Palestinian sovereignty, the inner envelope would be under
functional autonomy, the Old City under a special regime, and the Temple
Mount under a perpetual Palestinian trusteeship. Clinton was very pleased
with our proposal. Ehud also thought we had taken a courageous step
- that was before he made his own courageous decisions - and it was
a form of a breakthrough that extricated the process from its impasse."
TOP
What was the Palestinian
reaction?
"Disappointing.
The lawyer from Oxford said that they would demand compensation for
all the years of the occupation. Saeb Erekat also spoke along the same
lines in the presence of Clinton. I couldn't restrain myself and I burst
out. I told them that the negotiators on behalf of the Zionist movement
on the eve of the establishment of the Jewish state didn't behave as
nonchalantly [as the Palestinians at Camp David]. I asked them which
of the sides here wanted to establish a state - us or them. I felt terribly
frustrated that we were making such a creative, flexible move and reaching
one of the finest moments of the negotiations, and they couldn't free
themselves from their gibes, from the need for vindication, from their
victimization.
"Still, things
continued positively. Clinton went to Arafat and held a very tough talk
with him. And then, when Arafat found himself in hardship and felt that
he was on the edge of a precipice, he finally made a kind of counterproposal.
He told Clinton that he was ready to forgo between 8 and 10 percent
of the territory."
TOP
Are you saying
that on July 16, 2000, in a conversation with Clinton, Yasser Arafat agreed
to give Israel about a tenth of the West Bank?
"I am quoting
to you from what I recorded in my diary on July 17: `Yesterday Arafat
made a proposal to Clinton in relation to the scenario of the previous
night. He is ready to give territory of between 8 and 10 percent. He
told Clinton: 'I leave the matter of the [territorial] swap in your
hands, you decide.' He is ready for security arrangements as will be
decided. He places the emphasis on an international force. We will find
a solution on the refugee issue, too. Everything now stands or falls
over Jerusalem. Arafat wants a solution there that he can live with."
TOP
Is this the origin
of the Camp David formula for a territorial exchange: 9 percent of the
territories in return for 1 percent of sovereign Israeli territory?
"That formulation
was never crystallized in a binding document. But from the beginning
of the second week at Camp David, it was in the air. It was our working
assumption. And it was based on what Arafat had said. Not on some canton
scheme of Israel's, but on explicit remarks by Arafat. I remember that
on the 17th, I went to Ehud's cabin and I ran into Clinton, who was
just coming out of the cabin, and he told me the same: that Arafat's
message is readiness for 8 percent with a token territorial swap in
the Gaza Strip.
"In other talks
that day, Clinton said that `the Israelis did something precedent-setting,
and there was genuine and essential movement here to get to 80 percent
of the settlers and a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty.' His
impression was that the whole package was beginning to fall into place.
But some time later Arafat retracted. He conveyed a note to Clinton
in which he retracted."
TOP
Isn't it possible
that what Arafat did was to brilliantly maneuver the Israeli side into
breaking the great taboo of Jerusalem, by creating the false impression
that if you would only make a concession on Jerusalem, everything else
would be easily resolved and an agreement could be signed?
"I don't know.
I wouldn't be surprised if what he wanted at that moment was simply
to extricate himself from the plight he was in because of the flexibility
we showed and the American pressure on him. So he said a few words to
Clinton, which was no big deal from his point of view. You know, when
he went with us to Sharm al-Sheikh and promised to stop the shooting,
he also said a few words. But did he actually stop the shooting?"
TOP
Still, in the wake
of this dynamic, the Camp David conference became the Jerusalem conference.
Isn't it the case that you didn't reach a binding territorial agreement,
you didn't formulate a solution for the refugee question, all you did
was divide Jerusalem?
"That is
not completely accurate. It's true that there was a regression at
Camp David on the question of the refugees, but the feeling was that
there was flexibility on the territorial issue - that the peace would
not stand or fall on this issue. And in the security group, there
were very positive discussions that advanced the process. The concept
of a multinational force was crystallized. I also do not accept the
argument that we divided the city at Camp David. The decision on the
division of Jerusalem came only with the acceptance of Clinton's parameters
five months later.
"You have
to understand one thing: we at Camp David were moving toward a division
in practice but with the aspiration of reaching an agreement that
didn't look like a division. The big problem there was that the Palestinians
weren't willing to help us with that. They weren't ready for any face-saving
formulation for the Israelis. Not on the issue of the Temple Mount,
not on sovereignty, not on anything. Arafat did not agree to anything
that was not a complete division at Camp David. Therefore, even Bob
Malley, whom everyone now likes to quote, told me at some stage that
the Palestinians simply want to humiliate us. `They want to humiliate
you' were his words." [The reference is to an article by Hussein
Agha and Robert Malley - a member of the U.S. peace team and a special
assistant to President Clinton - "Camp David: The Tragedy of
Errors," The New York Review of Books, August 9, 2001.]
TOP
I understand that
there was a stage at which Barak astonished everyone by agreeing to divide
the Old City of Jerusalem into two quarters under Israeli sovereignty
and two quarters under Palestinian sovereignty. Did he do that on his
own or was it a joint decision made by the entire Israeli team?
"As I told
you, I suggested that a special regime be introduced in the Old City.
In the wake of that discussion, some time later, the president put forward
a two-two proposal, meaning a clear division of sovereignty. In a conversation
with the president, Ehud agreed that that would be a basis for discussion.
I remember walking in the fields with Martin Indyk [of the State Department]
that night and both of us saying that Ehud was nuts. We didn't understand
how he could even have thought of agreeing. Afterward I wrote in my
diary that everyone thinks that Amnon [Lipkin-] Shahak and I are pushing
Barak to the left, but the truth is that he was the one who pushed us
leftward. At that stage - this was the start of the second week of the
meeting - he was far more courageous than we were. Truly courageous.
Clinton told me a few times: I have never met such a courageous person."
TOP
So where did all
this lead?
"The Palestinians
did not accept the president's proposal on Jerusalem, and therefore
Ehud also retracted his agreement. At this point, he sent an angry letter
to Clinton in which he claimed that the president was not putting enough
pressure on Arafat. Sometime later, Clinton tried again. I have a note
in his handwriting in which he asks me if I am ready to put forward
Barak's acceptance of that principle again. I replied in the negative.
That proposal is off the agenda, I said.
"The result
was a deep crisis that almost led to the collapse of the conference
before Clinton's trip to Japan. Barak started to feel that he didn't
have a partner. That he was going farther than any other Israeli prime
minister and risking himself politically and losing his government,
but despite that, Arafat would not budge. Arafat refused to get into
the game.
"It was very
difficult for Ehud. Very difficult. After we decided to stay on despite
everything, and after Clinton left, Barak went into two days of isolation
in his cabin. None of us saw him for two days. He was in deep depression."
TOP
After Clinton returned
and the conference resumed, what was the focus in the last few days?
"In the final
analysis, what was on the table toward the end of the conference was
the president's proposal on the outer envelope under Palestinian sovereignty
and the Temple Mount under Israeli sovereignty but under a Palestinian
trusteeship. Apart from that, there were two variants: functional autonomy
in the inner neighborhoods and two quarters in the Old City under Palestinian
sovereignty, or Palestinian sovereignty in the inner neighborhoods and
functional autonomy in the Old City. There was also a third possibility,
of postponing the discussion on Jerusalem for three years.
"It was the
last night. It was late. I remember that before I left for Clinton's
cabin, Ehud took me aside and said this was a historic moment. Over
and over, he said it was a historic moment. Clinton was in jeans and
a light sweater and he sat with Erekat and me for a while around the
wooden table, until he asked me, finally, whether we were ready to accept
his proposal. I told him that for a change, I was not going to comment
until the Palestinians replied. After Barak had given a positive reply
to the two-two idea and the Palestinians had evaded the issue, we weren't
going to place ourselves in the same situation again.
"The president
thought that was fair and he didn't press me, but sent Erekat to Arafat.
He told him explicitly that if the chairman did not accept the proposal,
he must present a counterproposal. He promised that if there was a counterproposal,
he himself would stay and the conference would continue.
"I was the
only Israeli in the room. There wasn't a good feeling. Clinton was pretty
pessimistic by this time. An hour later, Erekat came back and said no.
I think he also brought something in writing. I took my leave of the
president and went back to Ehud. That's it, I told him, it's over."
TOP
So it was over
this that Camp David collapsed, the Palestinian rejection of an American
proposal on Jerusalem that you found inadequate?
"No. Camp David
collapsed over the fact that they refused to get into the game. They
refused to make a counterproposal. No one demanded that they give a
positive response to that particular proposal of Clinton's. Contrary
to all the nonsense spouted by the knights of the left, there was no
ultimatum. What was being asked of the Palestinians was far more elementary:
that they put forward, at least once, their own counterproposal. That
they not just say all the time `That's not good enough' and wait for
us to make more concessions. That's why the president sent [CIA director
George] Tenet to Arafat that night - in order to tell him that it would
be worth his while to think it over one more time and not give an answer
until the morning. But Arafat couldn't take it anymore. He missed the
applause of the masses in Gaza.
"At 9 A.M.
the next day, Arafat and Barak and Clinton met one more time. We stood
outside and prayed that something would somehow come of it: that when
Arafat would grasp that this was truly the 11th hour, he would, despite
everything, reconsider. But they came out five minutes after they started.
It was over."
TOP
The prevailing
view is that Camp David failed because of wrongheaded negotiating tactics
and because of the behavior of Ehud Barak, because Barak humiliated Arafat
and showed him disrespect.
"I think mistakes
were made. The method of negotiation was wrong - instead of discussions
by teams that then bring the results for the approval of the leaders,
there should have been a summit of leaders who would then tell the teams
what understandings they wanted them to formulate. There were also missed
opportunities. When the breakthrough on Jerusalem occurred, and when
Arafat made his concession, the right thing to do would have been to
convene the leaders for a kind of shock summit.
"But when all
is said and done, Camp David failed because Arafat refused to put forward
proposals of his own and didn't succeed in conveying to us the feeling
that at some point his demands would have an end. One of the important
things we did at Camp David was to define our vital interests in the
most concise way. We didn't expect to meet the Palestinians halfway,
and not even two-thirds of the way. But we did expect to meet them at
some point. The whole time we waited to see them make some sort of movement
in the face of our far-reaching movement. But they didn't. The feeling
was that they were constantly trying to drag us into some sort of black
hole of more and more concessions without it being at all clear where
all the concessions were leading, what the finish line was."
TOP
Why didn't you
propose some kind of partial agreement? When it became clear that it was
impossible to crack the basic problems, why didn't you try to reach at
least an interim settlement?
"At a number
of points in time we did propose to the Palestinians that we go to a
partial settlement - without Jerusalem and without refugees. That possibility
came up on the last night, too. The Palestinians refused. On the one
hand, they weren't ready to compromise on the core issues, certainly
not on Jerusalem, but on the other, they didn't agree to go for a partial
settlement either. The allegations against Barak on this point are total
nonsense. I remember that at a certain point, I proposed to Arafat that
we delay the discussion on Jerusalem for two years. `Not even for two
hours,' Arafat said, waving two of his fingers."
TOP
But what about
Barak the person, what about his behavior? Wasn't he too tough in his
attitude toward Arafat?
"Look, Ehud
is not a very pleasant person. It's hard to like him. He is closed and
introverted and there is no emotional contact with him. We all experienced
that. But does anyone really think that if Ehud Barak had been nicer
to Arafat, that Arafat would have given up the right of return? Or Haram
al-Sharif [the Temple Mount]? The fact is that during the dinner that
Nava [Barak's wife] and Ehud gave for Arafat in their home in Kochav
Yair about two months after Camp David, Barak was extraordinarily warm
toward the chairman, in a way that isn't commensurate with his personality.
I remember saying to Ruthie, my wife, at the time that Barak wants an
agreement so badly that he is ready to change his personality. Three
days later the intifada erupted."
TOP
Nevertheless, tell
me about the relations between the two at Camp David.
"Actually,
they never met at all. Not really. There was one dinner that Madeleine
Albright gave in order to break the ice, at which Barak sat like a pillar
of salt and didn't say a word for hours. That was very embarrassing.
That was at one of the low points, when Clinton was in Japan and Barak
was absolutely furious with Arafat. He couldn't bear the situation in
which he was risking everything and was dependent on that person but
didn't find him to be a partner. I remember that we stood there next
to some wall clock and Barak said that if an agreement is reached with
that character he would make the wall clock walk.
"But there
is something deeper here. Barak, as you known, is a Cartesian type.
So what happened there between the cabins and the lawns of Maryland
was really an encounter between a person who was looking for a rational
settlement and another person who talks myths and embodies myths. And
that encounter didn't work. In retrospect, I understand that it could
never have worked. I believe today that no rational Israeli leader could
have succeeded in reaching a settlement with Arafat at that encounter.
The man is simply not built that way."
TOP
Why?
"Arafat is
not an earthly leader. He sees himself as a mythological figure. He
has always represented himself as a kind of modern Salah a-Din. Therefore,
even the concrete real-estate issues don't interest him so much. At
Camp David, it was clear that he wasn't looking for practical solutions,
but was focused on mythological subjects: the right of return, Jerusalem,
the Temple Mount. He floats on the heights of the Islamic ethos and
the refugee ethos and the Palestinian ethos.
"Arafat's discourse
is never practical, either. His sentences don't connect and aren't completed.
There are words, there are sentences, there are metaphors - there is
no clear position. The only things there are, are codes and nothing
else. At the end of the process, you suddenly understand that you are
not moving ahead in the negotiations because you are in fact negotiating
with a myth."
TOP
But there have
been negotiations with him that succeeded, have there not?
"Those were
negotiations on interim agreements. A leader of that type can let his
aides conclude redeployments of 10 percent or 20 percent because he
assumes that what he doesn't get today, he will get tomorrow. There,
he will be able to compromise. But when the end of the game arrives,
he finds himself in a terrible plight because for him to conclude the
process is to say, `I have stopped being a myth; now I am just the head
of a small state.' He is a kind of eternal globetrotter who is simply
afraid to face up to reality. That's why he is always fleeing from decision-making.
I don't know any precedent in history for such severe behavior of fleeing
decisions as that of Arafat."
TOP
But even after
Camp David you didn't throw in the towel: the contacts continued in August
and September 2000, did they not?
"Of course.
Dozens of meetings were held in those two months, a good many of them
at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. There was a two-track effort:
our talks with the Palestinians, and talks by the Palestinians and us
with the Americans. Throughout this period, we were really waiting for
the Americans to work out a package that would be presented to both
sides. In this period I personally pressured the Americans to work the
collective memory that was created at Camp David into a document: to
collate all the presidential summations that were recorded there, and
out of them build a comprehensive proposal.
"However, the
Palestinians were very much afraid of any such proposal. They knew that
they wouldn't say yes to it, and they knew that saying no would cause
them tremendous international damage. As it was, their situation was
already very bad. Europe supported us, the Arab world didn't support
them - they were quite isolated. On the eve of the intifada their situation
was almost desperate."
TOP
Are you suggesting
that the intifada was a calculated move by the Palestinians to extricate
them from their political and diplomatic hardships?
"No. I am not
attributing that kind of Machiavellian scheme to them. But I remember
that when we were at Camp David, Saeb Erekat said that we had until
September 13. And I remember that when I visited Mohammed Dahlan and
from his office spoke with Marwan Barghouti, he also said that if we
didn't reach an agreement by the middle of September, it would not be
good. There was a tone of threat in his words that I didn't like. So,
when you look at the course of events and see that the violence erupted
exactly two weeks after September 13 [the seventh anniversary of the
Oslo accords], it makes you think. One thing is certain: the intifada
absolutely saved Arafat."
TOP
Did any changes
occur in the Israeli position during the talks that were held in August
and September?
"Yes. By this
stage, we were talking about the division of vertical sovereignty on
the Temple Mount. Now the Temple Mount wasn't under Israeli sovereignty
and Palestinian trusteeship, it was completely under Palestinian sovereignty.
All we asked for was sovereignty in the depths of the mount. We demanded
recognition that the site is sacred to us, that we have an attachment
to it. But all along, the Palestinians were scornful of our demand.
They denied that we had any sort of right on the Temple Mount."
TOP
Was there also
a change on the territorial issue?
"By September
we were talking about 7 percent [of the West Bank to be retained by
Israel] in return for 2 [percent of sovereign Israeli territory to be
transferred to the Palestinians]. I think we also dropped the demand
for sovereignty in the Jordan Rift Valley."
TOP
When did that happen?
When was the decision made to give up sovereignty in the Rift Valley?
"I can't tell
you exactly when. But in the wake of the summations at Camp David on
security and on a multinational force, the feeling was that we had arrived
at solutions that would preserve our most essential security interests
even without sovereignty. It was clear to us that our demand for sovereignty
in the Jordan Rift Valley was something the Palestinians could not live
with."
TOP
Did you draw up
new maps?
"As I told
you, no new map was presented to the Palestinians through Taba. But
we worked on new internal maps that would reflect the new percentages.
And when the ridiculous contention was voiced that what we were proposing
to the Palestinians was cantons and that they would not have territorial
contiguity, I went to [Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak and showed
him a map. As I recall, it was still the 8-percent map, a map of 8-92.
Mubarak perused it with interest and asked aloud why the Palestinians
were claiming they didn't have contiguity."
TOP
Throughout this
whole period, didn't the Palestinians present maps of their own? Was there
no Palestinian geographical proposal?
"They did not
present maps at all. Not before Taba. But at Camp David I did chance
to see some sort of Palestinian map. It was a map that reflected a concession
of less than 2 percent on their part in return for a territorial swap
in a 1:1 ratio. But the territories they wanted from us were not in
the Halutza dunes, they wanted them next to the West Bank. I remember
that according to their map, Kochav Yair, for example, was supposed
to be included in the territory of the Palestinian state; they demanded
sovereignty over Kochav Yair."
TOP
When the talks
resumed in November-December, as the violence raged, but with elections
for prime minister in the offing, in what area did they make progress?
"Mainly on
the Jerusalem question. By this stage, we had agreed to the division
of the city and to full Palestinian sovereignty on Haram al-Sharif,
but we insisted that some sort of attachment of ours to the Temple Mount
be recognized. I remember that when we held talks with Yasser Abed Rabbo
at Bolling Air Force Base, I raised the following idea without consulting
anyone: the Palestinians would have sovereignty on the Temple Mount,
but they would undertake not to conduct excavations there because the
place was sacred to the Jews. The Palestinians agreed not to excavate,
but under no circumstances would they agree to give us the minimal statement,
`because the site is sacred to the Jews.'
"What particularly
outraged me on that occasion wasn't only the fact that they refused,
but the way in which they refused: out of a kind of total contempt,
an attitude of dismissiveness and arrogance. At that moment I grasped
they are really not Sadat [Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who signed
a peace treaty with Israel in 1979]. That they were not willing to move
toward our position even at the emotional and symbolic level. At the
deepest level, they are not ready to recognize that we have any kind
of title here."
TOP
Three days later,
on December 23, 2000, at the end of the Bolling talks, Clinton convened
you again and presented his narrow parameters. What were they?
"Ninety-seven
percent: 96 percent of the West Bank [to the Palestinians] plus 1 percent
of sovereign Israeli territory, or 94 percent of the West Bank plus
three percent of sovereign Israeli territory. However, because Clinton
also introduced into this formulation the concept of the safe passage
route - over which Israeli sovereignty would be ethereal - it could
be argued that the Palestinians got almost 100 percent. Clinton constructed
his proposal in such a way that if the Palestinians' answer was positive,
they would be able to present the solution to their public as a solution
of 100 percent."
TOP
And Jerusalem?
"As the reports
said: what is Jewish is Israeli, what is Arab is Palestinian. The Temple
Mount would be under full Palestinian sovereignty, with Israel getting
the Western Wall and the Holy of Holies. But Clinton, in his proposal,
did not make reference to the `sacred basin' - the whole area outside
the Old City wall that includes the City of David and the Tombs of the
Prophets on the road to the Mount of Olives. We demanded that area,
in which there are hardly any Arabs, but the Palestinians refused. During
the night, there was a very firm phone call between Barak and Clinton
on this subject, because we were afraid he would decide against us.
As a result of that call, the subject remained open. Clinton did not
refer to it."
TOP
What about the
refugees?
"Here Clinton
tried to square the circle. He went toward the Palestinians to the very
end of the farthest limit of what we could accept. His formulation was
that `the two sides recognize the right of the refugees to return to
historic Palestine' or `to return to their homeland,' but on the other
hand, he made it clear that `there is no specific right of return to
Israel.' We were pleased that he talked about a two-state solution and
that the Palestinian state was the homeland of the Palestinian people
and Israel the home of the Jewish people.
"The mechanism
he referred to was more or less that of Stockholm. He obligated a certain
absorption of refugees in Israel, but subject to Israel's sovereign
laws and its absorption policy."
TOP
What about the
security arrangements and demilitarization?
"We insisted
that the Palestinian state be demilitarized. The president suggested
a softer term: a `non-militarized state.' He also asserted that we would
have a significant military presence in the Rift Valley for three years
and a symbolic presence at defined sites for three more years. We were
given three early-warning stations for a 10-year period with the presence
of Palestinian liaison officers."
TOP
Was there an explicit
ban on Palestinian use of tanks, war planes and missiles?
"No. To the
best of my knowledge, we didn't reach those details. They were certainly
not mentioned by Clinton. But that was the intention."
And what about
air and water rights?
"The Palestinians
refused to enter into a discussion about the water issue, so Clinton
did not make any reference to the subject. On the other hand, with regard
to air space, the term was `agreed use.' Clinton declared that sovereignty
over air space would be Palestinian, but recognized Israel's right to
make use of it for training purposes and for operational needs, providing
such use would be agreed. One idea was that the ways for it to be used
would be on a mutual basis: by giving the Palestinians the right to
make nonmilitary use of Israeli air space."
TOP
What was the Israeli
reaction to Clinton's parameters? Did Barak accept them wholeheartedly?
"The president
dictated the points to us and to the Palestinians in a conference
room adjacent to the Oval Office in the White House. It was a Saturday.
I remember walking from the hotel to the White House and back. Clinton
explained that the parameters were not an American proposal but constituted
his understanding of the midway point between the positions the sides
had reached. Now everything depends on the decision of the leaders,
he said, and asked for that decision to be made within four days.
"The proposal
was difficult for us to accept. No one came out dancing and singing,
and Ehud especially was perturbed. At the same time, three days later,
the cabinet decided on a positive response to Clinton. All the ministers
supported it, with the exception of Matan Vilnai and Ra'anan Cohen.
I informed the Americans that Israel's answer was yes."
TOP
And the Palestinians?
"Arafat wasn't
in any hurry. He went to Mubarak and then to all kinds of inter-Arab
meetings and dragged his feet. He didn't even return Clinton's calls.
The whole world, and I mean the whole world, put tremendous pressure
on him, but he refused to say yes. During those 10 days there was hardly
any international leader who didn't call him - from the Duke of Liechtenstein
to the president of China. But Arafat wouldn't be budged. He stuck to
his evasive methods. He's like one of those stealth planes. Finally,
very late, his staff conveyed to the White House a reply that contained
big noes and small yeses. Bruce Reidell, from the National Security
Council, told me that we shouldn't get it wrong, that there should be
no misunderstandings on our part: Arafat in fact said no."
TOP
But didn't Israel
also have reservations?
"Yes. We sent
the Americans a document of several pages containing our reservations.
But as far as I recall, they were pretty minor and dealt mainly with
security arrangements and deployment areas and control over the passages.
There was also clarification concerning our sovereignty over the Temple
Mount. There was no doubt that our reply was positive. In order to remove
any doubts, I called Arafat on December 29, at Ehud's instructions,
and told him that Israel accepted the parameters and that any further
discussion should be only within the framework of the parameters and
on how to implement them."
TOP
In the light of
all this, was there any point in holding the Taba meeting? After all,
you went all the way to the red line and the Palestinians said it wasn't
enough. What was there left to talk about?
"The truth
is that Ehud thought exactly that. He didn't want to go to Taba. He
didn't see any point or purpose in it. But at this stage there was a
pistol on the table. The elections were a month away, and there was
a minister who told Ehud that if he didn't go to Taba they would denounce
him in public for evading his duty to make peace. He had no choice but
to go to a meeting for something he himself no longer believed in."
TOP
So what did you
talk about in Taba? What new progress was made there?
"We insisted
that Clinton's parameters for negotiations would not be thrown open
for renewed discussion in any sphere, that we would address only the
question of how to implement them. The Palestinians, however, tried
to whittle away at the parameters. They tried to squeeze a bit more
out of us: on the Jerusalem question they didn't accept the idea of
the Holy of Holies, which appears explicitly in the Clinton proposals.
And on the refugee issue they suggested a formulation that meant that
they had their own reading of [United Nations General Assembly Resolution
194, December 11, 1948], while the Israelis had a different reading.
They said `we have to establish the right of return and then discuss
the mechanisms.' That demand of principle infuriated me no less than
when they occasionally mentioned numbers [of refugees]."
TOP
What sort of numbers
did they mention?
"Look, I didn't
sit opposite them in the negotiations on the refugee issue at Taba.
But the various information papers that were passed around at Taba contained
some extraordinary numbers. What do you think of 150,000 refugees a
year during a 10-year period?"
And what did we
propose?
"Yossi Beilin
said he proposed 40,000. I don't know whether that is really the figure,
but with that figure it was obvious that no deal could be struck unless
the ends were left loose for additional claims in the future."
What was the new
map you showed the Palestinians at Taba?
"Here it is,
you can see for yourself. The brownish-mustard color is Palestinian,
the white is Israeli. It represents a ratio of 94.5 percent [of the
land for the Palestinians] against 5.5 percent. And that's before the
[territorial] swap, of course."
TOP
Did you reach agreement
on a territorial exchange?
"No. It turned
out that the Palestinians don't like the idea of the Halutza dunes.
I'm not crazy about it either. I see that area as a last reserve for
Zionist settlement inside the [1967] Green Line. So we examined the
possibility of transferring land in the southern Mount Hebron region,
in the area north of Arad. But that was extremely difficult - half a
percent here, a quarter there. I'm not sure that the whole idea of a
land swap is feasible. It could be that the only way to do it is by
moving the border with Egypt to the east and then giving the Palestinians
Egyptian territory adjacent to the Gaza Strip. But neither we nor the
Palestinians wanted to raised that idea with the Egyptians."
Is it the case
that Israel would have to uproot about a hundred settlements according
to the new map?
"I don't know
the exact number. But we are talking about uprooting many dozens of
settlements. In my view, that map also fails to meet the goal we set
ourselves and to which Clinton agreed - 80 percent of the settlers in
sovereign Israeli territory."
TOP
Did the Palestinians
accept this map?
"No. They presented
a counter-map that totally eroded the three already shrunken [settlement]
blocs and effectively they voided the whole bloc concept of content.
According to their map, only a few isolated settlements would remain,
which would be dependent on thin strings of narrow access roads. A calculation
we made showed that all they agreed to give us was 2.34 percent."
You say that during
this whole period between June and January, in the period when you conceded
the Rift Valley and accepted the idea of a territorial swap and divided
Jerusalem and handed over the Temple Mount - that the whole movement of
the Palestinians toward Israel was in fractions of percentage points.
So, all they added to the pledge of 2 percent that they gave Clinton from
the outset was 0.34 percent?
"It's hard
for me to argue with you. But that is exactly why the criticism we have
taken from the left leaves me gaping. I simply don't understand it.
It's true that both Barak and I were sort of `outside children' of the
left. Neither of us is a professional peace industrialist. But look
where we got to. Tell me what more we were supposed to do."
TOP
You and Ehud Barak
set out on a journey to the bowels of the earth, as it were, to the very
heart of the conflict. What did you find?
"I think that
we found a few difficult things. First of all, regarding Arafat, we
discovered that he does not have the ability to convey to his Israeli
interlocutors that the process of making concessions has an end. His
strategy is one of conflict."
Are you saying
that he is not a partner?
"Arafat is
the leader of the Palestinians. I cannot change this fact; it is their
disaster. He is so loyal to his truth that he cannot compromise it.
But his truth is the truth of the Islamic ethos, the ethos of refugees
and victimization. This truth does not allow him to end his negotiations
with Israel unless Israel breaks its neck. So in this particular aspect,
Arafat is not a partner. Worse, Arafat is a strategic threat; he endangers
peace in the Middle East and in the world."
TOP
So he still does
not recognize Israel's right to exist?
"Arafat's concession
vis-a-vis Israel at Oslo was a formal concession. Morally and conceptually,
he didn't recognize Israel's right to exist. He doesn't accept the idea
of two states for two peoples. He may be able to make some sort of partial,
temporary settlement with us - though I have doubts about that, too
- but at the deep level, he doesn't accept us. Neither he nor the Palestinian
national movement accept us."
TOP
Your criticism
goes beyond Arafat personally to include also the Palestinian national
movement as a whole?
"Yes. Intellectually,
I can understand their logic. I understand that from their point of
view, they ceded 78 percent [of historic Palestine] at Oslo, so the
rest is theirs. I understand that from their point of view, the process
is one of decolonization, and therefore they are not going to make a
compromise with us, just as the residents of Congo would not compromise
with the Belgians.
"But when all
is said and done, after eight months of negotiations, I reach the conclusion
that we are in a confrontation with a national movement in which there
are serious pathological elements. It is a very sad movement, a very
tragic movement, which at its core doesn't have the ability to set itself
positive goals.
"At the end
of the process, it is impossible not to form the impression that the
Palestinians don't want a solution as much as they want to place Israel
in the dock of the accused. More than they want a state of their own,
they want to denounce our state. That is why, contrary to the Zionist
movement, they are incapable of compromising. Because they have no image
of the future society that they want and for which it is worth compromising.
Therefore, the process, from their point of view, is not one of conciliation
but of vindication. Of righting a wrong. Of undermining out existence
as a Jewish state."
TOP
Did you reach these
harsh conclusions in the course of the talks?
"I think it
was a cumulative process. There were a number of moments that led me
to these conclusions, but the hardest moment was Arafat's reaction to
Clinton's parameters. Because with Clinton's parameters we reached them
with a government that had no parliamentary or public foundation, and
with the intifada in the background and the army high command coming
out against us. In that situation, the only possibility for a Palestinian
leader with a vision to reach a settlement with us was to say a thunderous
yes. No mumbling, a thunderous, ringing statement. If Arafat had come
out with a ringing yes at the end of December, he would have saved the
Barak government and saved the peace."
TOP
He saw you drowning
and didn't lift a finger?
"He saw us
drowning and the peace drowning and time running out. It was only then
that I understood clearly that for Arafat, the negotiations would end
only when Israel was broken."
TOP
In other words,
the critical experiment took place not at Camp David but revolved around
Clinton's parameters?
"Of course.
Until then it could be argued that we didn't give enough, but after
Clinton's parameters and at Taba it was already 100 percent of the territory.
And you had to be blind and deaf not to know that Barak was going to
lose the election. You had to be blind and deaf not to understand that
it was all going down the tubes. But despite everything, they didn't
budge. At Taba, too, they didn't budge. A dream proposal is on the table,
but the Palestinians are in no hurry.
"I remember
looking at them and thinking to myself that I don't see any sense of
tragedy on their faces. I don't see the pain of a missed opportunity
in their eyes. That was a terrible thing for me, something that etched
itself within me. In the end, that was what led me to make a reassessment."
TOP
Have you reversed
your ideological position? Have you reached right-wing conclusions in
the wake of your failed journey to peace?
"Absolutely
not. I still believe that we cannot rule another people. That hasn't
worked anywhere, and it will not work here, either. Nor have I changed
my mind about the settlements. It was a brazen act to invest our national
energies in a hopeless settlement project in the heart of an Arab population.
And I continue to believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state
is a moral and political necessity."
"But today
I know that we have to construct a new paradigm - in a certain sense,
we have to restart the left-wing from the beginning. Not to ignore what
we discovered about the image of the other side. Not to ignore the Palestinian
and Islamic positions that call into question our right of existence.
And not to continue with this culture of giving in to pressure, which
is liable to lead us to suicide. We have to stop at the point that we
reached with Clinton and try to implement that solution with the help
of the international community. We mustn't forgo Jewish and Israeli
patriotism any longer, and we must understand that the blame does not
always lie with us. We have to say: That's it, there is no more. And
if the other side wants to destroy that core thing, too - I take my
stand by that core."
TOP
|
Radio Kol Yisrael 
